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Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes

Authors Umang Bhaskar , Yeshwant Pandit

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ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
Keywords
  • Fair Division
  • EFX
  • Multi-graphs

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Abstract

The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. 
In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.

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Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit. Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15

Author Details

Umang Bhaskar
  • Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
Yeshwant Pandit
  • Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India

Funding

Both authors acknowledge the support of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, under project no. RTI4001.

References

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