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On Controlling Knockout Tournaments Without Perfect Information

Authors Václav Blažej , Sushmita Gupta , M. S. Ramanujan , Peter Strulo

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Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Parameterized complexity and exact algorithms
Keywords
  • Parameterized algorithms
  • Tournament design
  • Imperfect information

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Abstract

Over the last decade, extensive research has been conducted on the algorithmic aspects of designing single-elimination (SE) tournaments. Addressing natural questions of algorithmic tractability, we identify key properties of input instances that enable the tournament designer to efficiently schedule the tournament in a way that maximizes the chances of a preferred player winning. Much of the prior algorithmic work on this topic focuses on the perfect (complete and deterministic) information scenario, especially in the context of fixed-parameter algorithm design. Our contributions constitute the first fixed-parameter tractability results applicable to more general settings of SE tournament design with potential imperfect information.

Cite As Get BibTex

Václav Blažej, Sushmita Gupta, M. S. Ramanujan, and Peter Strulo. On Controlling Knockout Tournaments Without Perfect Information. In 19th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 321, pp. 7:1-7:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2024.7

Author Details

Václav Blažej
  • University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Sushmita Gupta
  • The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, HBNI, Chennai, India
M. S. Ramanujan
  • University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Peter Strulo
  • University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

Funding

Supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (grant number EP/V044621/1).
  • Gupta, Sushmita: Supported by SERB’s MATRICS Grant (MTR/2021/000869) and SUPRA Grant (SPR/2021/000860).

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