LIPIcs.ISAAC.2021.68.pdf
- Filesize: 0.74 MB
- 17 pages
For the cake-cutting problem, Alijani, et al. [Reza Alijani et al., 2017; Masoud Seddighin et al., 2019] and Asano and Umeda [Takao Asano and Hiroyuki Umeda, 2020; Takao Asano and Hiroyuki Umeda, 2020] gave envy-free and truthful mechanisms with a small number of cuts, where the desired part of each player’s valuation function is a single interval on a given cake. In this paper, we give envy-free and truthful mechanisms with a small number of cuts, which are much simpler than those proposed by Alijani, et al. [Reza Alijani et al., 2017; Masoud Seddighin et al., 2019] and Asano and Umeda [Takao Asano and Hiroyuki Umeda, 2020; Takao Asano and Hiroyuki Umeda, 2020]. Furthermore, we show that this approach can be applied to the envy-free and truthful mechanism proposed by Chen, et al. [Yiling Chen et al., 2013], where the valuation function of each player is more general and piecewise uniform. Thus, we can obtain an envy-free and truthful mechanism with a small number of cuts even if the valuation function of each player is piecewise uniform, which solves the future problem posed by Alijani, et al. [Reza Alijani et al., 2017; Masoud Seddighin et al., 2019].
Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing