Document Open Access Logo

Relaxing Common Belief for Social Networks

Authors Noah Burrell , Grant Schoenebeck

PDF

File

Thumbnail PDF
PDF
LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.45.pdf
  • Filesize: 0.63 MB
  • 20 pages

Document Identifiers

Related Versions

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Social networks
  • Theory of computation → Network games
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
Keywords
  • Social networks
  • network revolt games
  • common belief

Metrics

  • Access Statistics
  • Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
    0
    PDF Downloads
    0
    Metadata Views

Abstract

We propose a relaxation of common belief called factional belief that is suitable for the analysis of strategic coordination on social networks. We show how this definition can be used to analyze revolt games on general graphs, including by giving an efficient algorithm that characterizes a structural result about the possible equilibria of such games.
This extends prior work on common knowledge and common belief, which has been too restrictive for use in understanding strategic coordination and cooperation in social network settings.

Cite As Get BibTex

Noah Burrell and Grant Schoenebeck. Relaxing Common Belief for Social Networks. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 185, pp. 45:1-45:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.45

Author Details

Noah Burrell
  • University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Grant Schoenebeck
  • University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Funding

The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation under Career Award #1452915.

References

  1. Robert J. Aumann. Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics, 4(6):1236-1239, 1976. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2958591.
  2. Cristina Bicchieri. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press, 2005. URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616037.
  3. Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Structure and strategy in collective action. American Journal of Sociology, 105(1):128-156, 1999. URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/210269.
  4. Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Communication and Coordination in Social Networks. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(1):1-16, January 2000. URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00118.
  5. Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, 2013. Google Scholar
  6. Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris. Expectations, networks, and conventions, 2017. URL: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2979086.
  7. Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris. Higher-order expectations, 2017. URL: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2979089.
  8. Dov Monderer and Dov Samet. Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior, 1(2):170-190, 1989. URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90017-1.
  9. Stephen Morris. Approximate common knowledge revisited. International Journal of Game Theory, 28(3):385-408, August 1999. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050116.
  10. Stephen Morris. Contagion. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(1):57-78, January 2000. URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00121.
  11. Stephen Morris. Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(4):433-445, December 2002. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/18.4.433.
  12. Stephen Morris. Coordination, timing and common knowledge. Research in Economics, 68(4):306-314, 2014. URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2014.04.004.
  13. Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin. Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 6(2):171-190, April 1997. URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008270519000.
  14. Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin, and Muhamet Yildiz. Common belief foundations of global games. Journal of Economic Theory, 163:826-848, 2016. URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.007.
  15. Ariel Rubinstein. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under "almost common knowledge". The American Economic Review, 79(3):385-391, 1989. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1806851.
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2025 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact