,
Yishay Mansour
,
Kobbi Nissim
,
Uri Stemmer
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
We introduce a new Bayesian perspective on the concept of data reconstruction, and leverage this viewpoint to propose a new security definition that, in certain settings, provably prevents reconstruction attacks. We use our paradigm to shed new light on one of the most notorious attacks in the privacy and memorization literature - fingerprinting code attacks (FPC). We argue that these attacks are really a form of membership inference attacks, rather than reconstruction attacks. Furthermore, we show that if the goal is solely to prevent reconstruction (but not membership inference), then in some cases the impossibility results derived from FPC no longer apply.
@InProceedings{kaplan_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.84,
author = {Kaplan, Haim and Mansour, Yishay and Nissim, Kobbi and Stemmer, Uri},
title = {{Bayesian Perspective on Memorization and Reconstruction}},
booktitle = {17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
pages = {84:1--84:18},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-410-9},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2026},
volume = {362},
editor = {Saraf, Shubhangi},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.84},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253713},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.84},
annote = {Keywords: Reconstruction, Memorization, Differential privacy}
}