Verified Double Sided Auctions for Financial Markets

Authors Raja Natarajan, Suneel Sarswat, Abhishek Kr Singh

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Author Details

Raja Natarajan
  • Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
Suneel Sarswat
  • Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
Abhishek Kr Singh
  • Birla Institute of Technology and Science Pilani, Goa, India


We wish to thank Mohit Garg for his generous contribution to this work.

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Raja Natarajan, Suneel Sarswat, and Abhishek Kr Singh. Verified Double Sided Auctions for Financial Markets. In 12th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 193, pp. 28:1-28:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


Double sided auctions are widely used in financial markets to match demand and supply. Prior works on double sided auctions have focused primarily on single quantity trade requests. We extend various notions of double sided auctions to incorporate multiple quantity trade requests and provide fully formalized matching algorithms for double sided auctions with their correctness proofs. We establish new uniqueness theorems that enable automatic detection of violations in an exchange program by comparing its output with that of a verified program. All proofs are formalized in the Coq proof assistant without adding any axiom to the system. We extract verified OCaml and Haskell programs that can be used by the exchanges and the regulators of the financial markets. We demonstrate the practical applicability of our work by running the verified program on real market data from an exchange to automatically check for violations in the exchange algorithm.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Information systems → Online auctions
  • Software and its engineering → Formal software verification
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
  • Theory of computation → Computational pricing and auctions
  • Theory of computation → Program verification
  • Theory of computation → Automated reasoning
  • Double Sided Auction
  • Formal Verification
  • Financial Markets
  • Proof Assistant


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