This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ω-automatic relations and their implications in the existence of equilibria.
@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31, author = {Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Grandmont, Christophe and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois}, title = {{Games with \omega-Automatic Preference Relations}}, booktitle = {50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)}, pages = {31:1--31:19}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-388-1}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2025}, volume = {345}, editor = {Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241381}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31}, annote = {Keywords: Games played on graphs, Nash equilibrium, \omega-automatic relations, \omega-recognizable relations, constrained Nash equilibria existence problem} }
Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing