,
Christophe Grandmont
,
Jean-François Raskin
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ω-automatic relations and their implications in the existence of equilibria.
@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31,
author = {Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Grandmont, Christophe and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois},
title = {{Games with \omega-Automatic Preference Relations}},
booktitle = {50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
pages = {31:1--31:19},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-388-1},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2025},
volume = {345},
editor = {Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241381},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
annote = {Keywords: Games played on graphs, Nash equilibrium, \omega-automatic relations, \omega-recognizable relations, constrained Nash equilibria existence problem}
}