,
Ting Zhu
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Quantum key distribution (QKD) leveraging satellites holds promise for global-scale secure communication. However, its practical deployment is threatened by the inherent predictability of satellite orbits, which exposes quantum channels to targeted eavesdropping attacks, compromising the physical-layer security guarantees of QKD. Through security analysis, we demonstrate that such attacks can drastically increase the quantum bit error rate (QBER) from 4.7% to 27.5%, effectively disrupting secure key generation. To address this fundamental vulnerability, we introduce a novel defense framework that integrates two strategies: (1) Stealthy Deployment, which obfuscates quantum satellites within massive LEO constellations to drastically increase an adversary’s search space, and (2) Dynamic Re-routing, which is an adaptive countermeasure that re-establishes QKD sessions via alternative paths upon eavesdropping detection. Evaluated through large-scale simulations incorporating real-world satellite data, our framework demonstrates up to a 90% improvement in key generation rate under active attack, ensuring robust and resilient satellite-based QKD without modifications to the underlying quantum hardware.
@InProceedings{song_et_al:OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11,
author = {Song, Guanqun and Zhu, Ting},
title = {{Stealthy Low Earth Orbit Satellite-To-Ground Quantum Communication}},
booktitle = {1st New Ideas in Networked Systems (NINeS 2026)},
pages = {11:1--11:26},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-414-7},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2026},
volume = {139},
editor = {Argyraki, Katerina and Panda, Aurojit},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255963},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11},
annote = {Keywords: LEO satellites, QKD, quantum communication}
}