How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk)

Halaburda, Hanna

doi:10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2

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OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2.pdf

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Document Identifiers

DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184196

Author Details

Hanna Halaburda

Stern School of Business, New York University, NY, USA

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Hanna Halaburda. How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 2:1-2:7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)
https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2

Abstract

Blockchain technologies are technologies inspired by Bitcoin, which emerged in 2008. Since then, many cryptocurrencies, altcoins, and other blockchain applications have emerged. For example, Ethereum introduced smart contracts, and with them came tokens, fungible tokens, non-fungible tokens, decentralized finance (DeFi), and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). All these technologies can be grouped under the umbrella term "blockchain technologies." Each new generation of blockchain technology promises decentralization, disintermediation, a level playing field for entry, and improved value creation and distribution. However, it is essential to examine to what extent and under what conditions blockchain technologies deliver on these promises. It turns out that sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not. This distinction is essential to apply blockchain technologies effectively for large-scale practical applications. I focus here on blockchain-based cryptographic tokens and their impact on platform economics. Blockchain-based tokens, in conjunction with smart contracts, allow for new design choices in platforms. Therefore, I explore how these new design choices may help solve old problems in platform economics.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification

Applied computing → Digital cash
Applied computing → E-commerce infrastructure
Applied computing → Electronic funds transfer
Applied computing → Online banking
Social and professional topics → Consumer products policy

Keywords

blockchain
token
platform economics

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References

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