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<h2>Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, </h2>
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<li>
    <span class="authors">Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Vincent Conitzer</span>
    <span class="title">Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson</span>
    <span class="title">Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia</span>
    <span class="title">Incentive Compatible Regression Learning</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen</span>
    <span class="title">Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Maria-Florina Balcan</span>
    <span class="title">Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe</span>
    <span class="title">License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Vincent Conitzer</span>
    <span class="title">Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.10">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.10</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, and Rakesh Vohra</span>
    <span class="title">On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Kate Larson</span>
    <span class="title">Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Robin S. Lee and Michael A. Schwarz</span>
    <span class="title">Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.13">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.13</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Yan Chen, Maxwell Harper, Joseph Konstan, and Sherry Li</span>
    <span class="title">Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.14">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.14</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Eric Budish and Estelle Cantillon</span>
    <span class="title">Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Assignment Problems: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocations</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.15">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.15</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Hervé Moulin</span>
    <span class="title">Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16">10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16</a>
</li>
</ul>

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