LIPIcs.CSL.2020.1.pdf
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Verification of Security Protocols (Invited Talk)
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28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2020)
Series: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
Conference: Computer Science Logic (CSL) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
- Publication Date: 2020-01-06
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Véronique Cortier. Verification of Security Protocols (Invited Talk). In 28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 152, pp. 1:1-1:2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2020.1
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2020.1
Abstract
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks like the Internet. Over the past decades, numerous decision procedures and tools have been developed to automatically analyse the security of protocols. The field has now reached a good level of maturity with efficient techniques for the automatic security analysis of protocols
After an overview of some famous protocols and flaws, we will describe the current techniques for security protocols analysis, often based on logic, and review the key challenges towards a fully automated verification.
Subject Classification
ACM Subject Classification
- Security and privacy → Formal security models
Keywords
- Security protocols
- automated deduction
- security
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References
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