When quoting this document, please refer to the following
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2005
Go to the corresponding Portal

Gairing, Martin ; L├╝cking, Thomas ; Mavronicolas, Marios ; Monien, Burkhard

The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost

05011.GairingMartin.ExtAbstract.pdf (0.2 MB)


In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well-studied KP model [KP99] for selfish routing that reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop [War52]. In the new model, user traffics are still unsplittable, while social cost is now the expectation of the sum, over all links, of a certain polynomial evaluated at the total latency incurred by all users choosing the link; we call it polynomial social cost. The polynomials that we consider have non-negative coefficients. We are interested in evaluating Nash equilibria in this model, and we use the Price of Anarchy as our evaluation measure. We prove the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for identical users and two links, and establish an approximate version of the conjecture for arbitrary many links. Moreover, we give upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Martin Gairing and Thomas L{\"u}cking and Marios Mavronicolas and Burkhard Monien},
  title =	{The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  year =	{2005},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  number =	{05011},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  annote =	{Keywords: selfish routing , KP-model , price of anarchy , fully mixed Nash Equilibrium}

Keywords: selfish routing , KP-model , price of anarchy , fully mixed Nash Equilibrium
Collection: 05011 - Computing and Markets
Issue Date: 2005
Date of publication: 19.07.2005

DROPS-Home | Fulltext Search | Imprint | Privacy Published by LZI