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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038
URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/203/
Gimpel, Henner
Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining
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Abstract
Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{gimpel:DagSemProc.05011.13,
author = {Gimpel, Henner},
title = {{Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining}},
booktitle = {Computing and Markets},
pages = {1--5},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2005},
volume = {5011},
editor = {Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/203},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13},
annote = {Keywords: compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio}
}
| Keywords: | compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio | |
| Seminar: | 05011 - Computing and Markets | |
| Issue date: | 2005 | |
| Date of publication: | 19.07.2005 |
