Levi, Isaac
Degrees of Belief
Abstract
A discussion of three kinds of degree of belief: subjective (credal) probability, degree of belief in the maximizing sense (expected epistemic utility) and degree of belief in the satisficing sense (Shackle type degrees of belief). The relations between these concepts and full belief (absolute certainty) and other qualitative assessments of belief (mere belief or plain belief) will be considered.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{levi:DagSemProc.05321.10,
author = {Levi, Isaac},
title = {{Degrees of Belief}},
booktitle = {Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics},
pages = {1--35},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2005},
volume = {5321},
editor = {James Delgrande and Jerome Lang and Hans Rott and Jean-Marc Tallon},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/327},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-3271},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.10},
annote = {Keywords: Inductive expansion, credal probability, maximizing and satisficing, full belief.}
}
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Keywords: |
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Inductive expansion, credal probability, maximizing and satisficing, full belief. |
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Seminar: |
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05321 - Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics
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Issue date: |
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2005 |
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Date of publication: |
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21.11.2005 |
21.11.2005
