Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Zhang, Yingqian; de Weerdt, Mathijs License
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18705


Creating incentives to prevent execution failures: an extension of VCG mechanism



When information or control in a multiagent planning system is private to the agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed outcome, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit. In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents can become negative when using VCG payments (i.e., VCG is not strongly individually rational). To deal with this problem, we introduce an extended payment structure which takes into account the actual execution of the promised outcome. We show that this extended mechanism can guarantee a nonnegative utility and is (i) incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) incentive compatible in dominant strategies if and only if all agents can be verified during execution.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Yingqian Zhang and Mathijs de Weerdt},
  title =	{Creating incentives to prevent execution failures: an extension of VCG mechanism},
  booktitle =	{Planning in Multiagent Systems},
  year =	{2009},
  editor =	{J{\"u}rgen Dix and Edmund H. Durfee and Cees Witteveen},
  number =	{08461},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, multiagent planning}

Keywords: Mechanism design, multiagent planning
Seminar: 08461 - Planning in Multiagent Systems
Issue date: 2009
Date of publication: 05.02.2009

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