False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Yokoo, Makoto

doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3

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False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Author Makoto Yokoo

Part of: Volume: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101
Part of: Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Publication Date: 2010-05-20

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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25621

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Keywords

Combinatorial auctions
mechanism design
false-name bids

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Abstract

In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids
under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses).
If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple
goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems
on false-name bids.

Cite As Get BibTex

Makoto Yokoo. False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010) https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3

Author Details

Makoto Yokoo

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