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Mindreading, Privileged Access and Understanding Narratives

Authors Szabolcs Kiss, Zoltán Jakab

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Szabolcs Kiss
Zoltán Jakab

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Szabolcs Kiss and Zoltán Jakab. Mindreading, Privileged Access and Understanding Narratives. In 2014 Workshop on Computational Models of Narrative. Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 41, pp. 88-105, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014) https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.CMN.2014.88

Abstract

In this paper we first offer a task analysis of the false belief test including the bidirectional relationship between mindreading and language. Following this we present our theory concerning Quinian bootstrapping of the meaning of mental state terms and relate it to the task-analytic framework. Finally we present an experiment on ascribing privileged access through minimal narratives which is intended to serve as a test of our theory.

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Keywords
  • mindreading
  • false belief attribution
  • privileged access
  • minimal narratives

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