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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.155
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-91599
URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2018/9159/
Kesselheim, Thomas ; Kodric, Bojana
Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents
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Abstract
We study the price of anarchy of mechanisms in the presence of risk-averse agents. Previous work has focused on agents with quasilinear utilities, possibly with a budget. Our model subsumes this as a special case but also captures that agents might be less sensitive to payments than in the risk-neutral model. We show that many positive price-of-anarchy results proved in the smoothness framework continue to hold in the more general risk-averse setting. A sufficient condition is that agents can never end up with negative quasilinear utility after playing an undominated strategy. This is true, e.g., for first-price and second-price auctions. For all-pay auctions, similar results do not hold: We show that there are Bayes-Nash equilibria with arbitrarily bad social welfare compared to the optimum.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{kesselheim_et_al:LIPIcs:2018:9159,
author = {Thomas Kesselheim and Bojana Kodric},
title = {{Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents}},
booktitle = {45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)},
pages = {155:1--155:14},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-076-7},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2018},
volume = {107},
editor = {Ioannis Chatzigiannakis and Christos Kaklamanis and D{\'a}niel Marx and Donald Sannella},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2018/9159},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-91599},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.155},
annote = {Keywords: Mechanism Design, Price of Anarchy, Risk Aversion, Smoothness}
}
| Keywords: | Mechanism Design, Price of Anarchy, Risk Aversion, Smoothness | |
| Seminar: | 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018) | |
| Issue date: | 2018 | |
| Date of publication: | 04.07.2018 |
