Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of n, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different distributed computing problems. Duplication - pretending to be more than one agent - is the main tool used by agents to deviate and increase their utility when not enough knowledge about n is given. We begin by proving that when no information on n is given, equilibrium is impossible for both Coloring and Knowledge Sharing. We then provide new algorithms for both problems when n is a-priori known to all agents. However, what if agents have partial knowledge about n? We provide tight upper and lower bounds that must be a-priori known on n for equilibrium to be possible in Leader Election, Knowledge Sharing, Coloring, Partition and Orientation.
@InProceedings{afek_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5,
author = {Afek, Yehuda and Rafaeli, Shaked and Sulamy, Moshe},
title = {{The Role of A-priori Information in Networks of Rational Agents}},
booktitle = {32nd International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2018)},
pages = {5:1--5:18},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-092-7},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2018},
volume = {121},
editor = {Schmid, Ulrich and Widder, Josef},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-97945},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5},
annote = {Keywords: rational agents, distributed game theory, coloring, knowledge sharing}
}