Argument Patterns for Multi-Concern Assurance of Connected Automated Driving Systems

Authors Fredrik Warg , Martin Skoglund



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Fredrik Warg
  • RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Borås, Sweden
Martin Skoglund
  • RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Borås, Sweden

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Fredrik Warg and Martin Skoglund. Argument Patterns for Multi-Concern Assurance of Connected Automated Driving Systems. In 4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 73, pp. 3:1-3:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019) https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.3

Abstract

Showing that dependable embedded systems fulfil vital quality attributes, e.g. by conforming to relevant standards, can be challenging. For emerging and increasingly complex functions, such as connected automated driving (CAD), there is also a need to ensure that attributes such as safety, cybersecurity, and availability are fulfilled simultaneously. Furthermore, such systems are often designed using existing parts, including 3rd party components, which must be included in the quality assurance. This paper discusses how to structure the argument at the core of an assurance case taking these considerations into account, and proposes patterns to aid in this task. The patterns are applied in a case study with an example automotive function. While the aim has primarily been safety and security assurance of CAD, their generic nature make the patterns relevant for multi-concern assurance in general.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Computer systems organization → Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks
  • Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-physical systems
Keywords
  • Multi-concern assurance
  • connected automated driving
  • dependability
  • functional safety
  • cybersecurity
  • cyber-physical systems
  • critical embedded systems

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References

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