Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Ganesh, Chaya; Magri, Bernardo; Venturi, Daniele https://www.dagstuhl.de/lipics License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC-BY 3.0)
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-124621
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Cryptographic Reverse Firewalls for Interactive Proof Systems

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Abstract

We study interactive proof systems (IPSes) in a strong adversarial setting where the machines of honest parties might be corrupted and under control of the adversary. Our aim is to answer the following, seemingly paradoxical, questions: - Can Peggy convince Vic of the veracity of an NP statement, without leaking any information about the witness even in case Vic is malicious and Peggy does not trust her computer? - Can we avoid that Peggy fools Vic into accepting false statements, even if Peggy is malicious and Vic does not trust her computer? At EUROCRYPT 2015, Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz introduced cryptographic reverse firewalls (RFs) as an attractive approach to tackling such questions. Intuitively, a RF for Peggy/Vic is an external party that sits between Peggy/Vic and the outside world and whose scope is to sanitize Peggy’s/Vic’s incoming and outgoing messages in the face of subversion of her/his computer, e.g. in order to destroy subliminal channels. In this paper, we put forward several natural security properties for RFs in the concrete setting of IPSes. As our main contribution, we construct efficient RFs for different IPSes derived from a large class of Sigma protocols that we call malleable. A nice feature of our design is that it is completely transparent, in the sense that our RFs can be directly applied to already deployed IPSes, without the need to re-implement them.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{ganesh_et_al:LIPIcs:2020:12462,
  author =	{Chaya Ganesh and Bernardo Magri and Daniele Venturi},
  title =	{{Cryptographic Reverse Firewalls for Interactive Proof Systems}},
  booktitle =	{47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)},
  pages =	{55:1--55:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-138-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{168},
  editor =	{Artur Czumaj and Anuj Dawar and Emanuela Merelli},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2020/12462},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-124621},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.55},
  annote =	{Keywords: Subversion, Algorithm substitution attacks, Cryptographic reverse firewalls, Interactive proofs, Zero knowledge}
}

Keywords: Subversion, Algorithm substitution attacks, Cryptographic reverse firewalls, Interactive proofs, Zero knowledge
Seminar: 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)
Issue date: 2020
Date of publication: 29.06.2020


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