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Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games

Authors Davide Bilò , Vittorio Bilò , Pascal Lenzner , Louise Molitor

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Davide Bilò
  • Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sassari, Italy
Vittorio Bilò
  • Department of Mathematics and Physics "Ennio De Giorgi", University of Salento, Lecce, Italy
Pascal Lenzner
  • Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam, Germany
Louise Molitor
  • Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam, Germany

Acknowledgements

We thank an anonymous reviewer for providing an idea on how to improve the PoA for balanced 2-SSGs (Corollary 11) to min{8/3, (2n+2)/n} and possibly even further. We will incorporate this improvement in the journal version of the paper.

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Davide Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Pascal Lenzner, and Louise Molitor. Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games. In 45th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 170, pp. 15:1-15:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2020.15

Abstract

Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling’s famous agent-based model for residential segregation explains how such clusters can form even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., if they agree to live in mixed neighborhoods. For segregation to occur, all it needs is a slight bias towards agents preferring similar neighbors. Very recently, Schelling’s model has been investigated from a game-theoretic point of view with selfish agents that strategically select their residential location. In these games, agents can improve on their current location by performing a location swap with another agent who is willing to swap. We significantly deepen these investigations by studying the influence of the underlying topology modeling the residential area on the existence of equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and on the dynamic properties of the resulting strategic multi-agent system. Moreover, as a new conceptual contribution, we also consider the influence of locality, i.e., if the location swaps are restricted to swaps of neighboring agents. We give improved almost tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy for arbitrary underlying graphs and we present (almost) tight bounds for regular graphs, paths and cycles. Moreover, we give almost tight bounds for grids, which are commonly used in empirical studies. For grids we also show that locality has a severe impact on the game dynamics.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
  • Theory of computation → Quality of equilibria
  • Theory of computation → Convergence and learning in games
  • Theory of computation → Network games
Keywords
  • Residential Segregation
  • Schelling’s Segregation Model
  • Non-cooperative Games
  • Price of Anarchy
  • Game Dynamics

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