In this paper, we introduce Polygraph, the first accountable Byzantine consensus algorithm. If among n users f < n/3 are malicious then it ensures consensus, otherwise it eventually detects malicious users that cause disagreement. Polygraph is appealing for blockchains as it allows to totally order blocks in a chain whenever possible, hence avoiding double spending and, otherwise, to punish at least n/3 malicious users when a fork occurs. This problem is more difficult than it first appears. Blockchains typically run in open networks whose delays are hard to predict, hence one cannot build upon synchronous techniques [Andreas Haeberlen et al., 2007; Vitalik Buterin and Virgil Griffith, 2019]. One may exploit cryptographic evidence of PBFT-like consensus [Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov, 2002], however detecting equivocation would be insufficient. We show that it is impossible without extra logs of at least Ω(n) rounds [Pierre Civit et al., 2019]. Each round of Polygraph exchanges O(n²) messages.
@InProceedings{civit_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2020.45, author = {Civit, Pierre and Gilbert, Seth and Gramoli, Vincent}, title = {{Brief Announcement: Polygraph: Accountable Byzantine Agreement}}, booktitle = {34th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2020)}, pages = {45:1--45:3}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-168-9}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2020}, volume = {179}, editor = {Attiya, Hagit}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2020.45}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-131236}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2020.45}, annote = {Keywords: Fault detection, cryptography, equivocation, consensus} }
Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing