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Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas in the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties

Authors Hiromichi Goko, Kazuhisa Makino, Shuichi Miyazaki , Yu Yokoi

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Author Details

Hiromichi Goko
  • Frontier Research Center, Toyota Motor Corporation, Aichi, Japan
Kazuhisa Makino
  • Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Kyoto University, Japan
Shuichi Miyazaki
  • Academic Center for Computing and Media Studies, Kyoto University, Japan
Yu Yokoi
  • Principles of Informatics Research Division, National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan

Funding

This work was partially supported by the joint project of Kyoto University and Toyota Motor Corporation, titled "Advanced Mathematical Science for Mobility Society."
  • Makino, Kazuhisa: Supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP19K22841, JP20H00609, and JP20H05967.
  • Miyazaki, Shuichi: Supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP20K11677 and JP16H02782.
  • Yokoi, Yu: Supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP18K18004 and JST PRESTO Grant Number JPMJPR212B.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Cite As Get BibTex

Hiromichi Goko, Kazuhisa Makino, Shuichi Miyazaki, and Yu Yokoi. Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas in the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties. In 39th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 219, pp. 31:1-31:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2022.31

Abstract

Motivated by the serious problem that hospitals in rural areas suffer from a shortage of residents, we study the Hospitals/Residents model in which hospitals are associated with lower quotas and the objective is to satisfy them as much as possible. When preference lists are strict, the number of residents assigned to each hospital is the same in any stable matching because of the well-known rural hospitals theorem; thus there is no room for algorithmic interventions. However, when ties are introduced to preference lists, this will no longer apply because the number of residents may vary over stable matchings.
In this paper, we formulate an optimization problem to find a stable matching with the maximum total satisfaction ratio for lower quotas. We first investigate how the total satisfaction ratio varies over choices of stable matchings in four natural scenarios and provide the exact values of these maximum gaps. Subsequently, we propose a strategy-proof approximation algorithm for our problem; in one scenario it solves the problem optimally, and in the other three scenarios, which are NP-hard, it yields a better approximation factor than that of a naive tie-breaking method. Finally, we show inapproximability results for the above-mentioned three NP-hard scenarios.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Approximation algorithms analysis
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
Keywords
  • Stable matching
  • Hospitals/Residents problem
  • Lower quota
  • NP-hardness
  • Approximation algorithm
  • Strategy-proofness

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