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Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG

Authors Dahlia Malkhi, Pawel Szalachowski

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Dahlia Malkhi
  • Chainlink Labs, UK
Pawel Szalachowski
  • Chainlink Labs, UK

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Soumya Basu, Christian Cachin, Ari Juels, Mahimna Kelkar, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias, Oded Naor, Mike Reiter for many comments that helped improve this writeup.

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Dahlia Malkhi and Pawel Szalachowski. Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 6:1-6:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023) https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6

Abstract

Many cryptocurrency platforms are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks [Daian et al., 2020], where a malicious consensus leader can inject transactions or change the order of user transactions to maximize its profit. 
A promising line of research in MEV mitigation is to enhance the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) consensus core of blockchains by new functionalities, like hiding transaction contents, such that malicious parties cannot analyze and exploit them until they are ordered. An orthogonal line of research demonstrates excellent performance for BFT protocols designed around Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG). They provide high throughput by keeping high network utilization, decoupling transactions' dissemination from their metadata ordering, and encoding consensus logic efficiently over a DAG representing a causal ordering of disseminated messages.
This paper explains how to combine these two advances. It introduces a DAG-based protocol called Fino, that integrates MEV-resistance features into DAG-based BFT without delaying the steady spreading of transactions by the DAG transport and with zero message overhead. The scheme operates without complex secret share verifiability or recoverability, and avoids costly threshold encryption.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Security and privacy → Distributed systems security
Keywords
  • DAG
  • MEV
  • consensus
  • BFT

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