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Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes

Authors: Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen, and Nicholas R. Jennings

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract

We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Moreoever, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market. Finally, by combining analystical and simulation results, we analyse equilibrium strategies in case of several global bidders. However, a stable solution is then only found if there are local bidders as well.

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Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gerding_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.18,
  author =	{Gerding, Enrico H. and Dash, Rajdeep K. and Yuen, David C. K. and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
  title =	{{Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9934},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bidding strategies, Vickrey Auctions, Perfect Substitutes, Simultaneous Auctions, Budget Constraint, Global Bidder}
}

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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21

Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets

Authors: Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, and Nicholas R. Jennings

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids.

Cite as

Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gerding_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.21,
  author =	{Gerding, Enrico H. and Rogers, Alex and Dash, Rajdeep K. and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
  title =	{{Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9979},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Competing Sellers, Shill Bidding, Auction Fees, Reserve Price}
}

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Documents authored by Gerding, Enrico H.

Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes

Abstract

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Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets

Abstract

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