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Documents authored by Krysta, Piotr

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52
Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary

Authors: Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
One of the classic problems in online decision-making is the secretary problem, where the goal is to hire the best secretary out of n rankable applicants or, in a natural extension, to maximize the probability of selecting the largest number from a sequence arriving in random order. Many works have considered generalizations of this problem where one can accept multiple values subject to a combinatorial constraint. The seminal work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg (SODA'07, JACM'18) proposed the matroid secretary conjecture, suggesting that there exists an O(1)-competitive algorithm for the matroid constraint, and many works since have attempted to obtain algorithms for both general matroids and specific classes of matroids. The ultimate goal of these results is to obtain an e-competitive algorithm, and the strong matroid secretary conjecture states that this is possible for general matroids. One of the most important classes of matroids is the graphic matroid, where a set of edges in a graph is deemed independent if it contains no cycle. Given the rich combinatorial structure of graphs, obtaining algorithms for these matroids is often seen as a good first step towards solving the problem for general matroids. For matroid secretary, Babaioff et al. (SODA'07, JACM'18) first studied graphic matroid case and obtained a 16-competitive algorithm. Subsequent works have improved the competitive ratio, most recently to 4 by Soto, Turkieltaub, and Verdugo (SODA'18). In this paper, we break the 4-competitive barrier for the problem, obtaining a new algorithm with a competitive ratio of 3.95. For the special case of simple graphs (i.e., graphs that do not contain parallel edges) we further improve this to 3.77. Intuitively, solving the problem for simple graphs is easier as they do not contain cycles of length two. A natural question that arises is whether we can obtain a ratio arbitrarily close to e by assuming the graph has a large enough girth. We answer this question affirmatively, proving that one can obtain a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to e even for constant values of girth, providing further evidence for the strong matroid secretary conjecture. We further show that this bound is tight: for any constant g, one cannot obtain a competitive ratio better than e even if we assume that the input graph has girth at least g. To our knowledge, such a bound was not previously known even for simple graphs.
Cite as

Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski. Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 52:1-52:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{banihashem_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52,
  author =	{Banihashem, Kiarash and Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi and Kowalski, Dariusz R. and Krysta, Piotr and Mittal, Danny and Olkowski, Jan},
  title =	{{Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{52:1--52:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245205},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  annote =	{Keywords: online algorithms, graphic matroids, secretary problem}
}
Document
RANDOM
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.41
What Is the Minimum Number of Random Bits Required for Computability and Efficiency in Anonymous Networks?

Authors: Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, and Shay Kutten

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 353, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)

Abstract
Angluin (STOC'80) and Yamashita and Kameda (PODC'88) show that some useful distributed tasks are impossible (for deterministic algorithms) in a general network if nodes do not possess unique identifiers. However, any task decidable in the non-distributed context, can be solved deterministically if the network has a unique leader. Alternatively, much research has been devoted to randomized distributed algorithms in anonymous networks. We present tight upper and lower bounds for the fundamental question: How much randomness is necessary and sufficient to solve Leader Election (LE) in anonymous networks, i.e., to transform an anonymous network into a non-anonymous one? We prove that at least one random bit per node is required in some cases. Surprisingly, a single random bit is also enough, for a total of n bits, where n is the number of nodes. However, the time complexity of our (total of) n random bits algorithm for general networks turned out to be impractically high. Hence, we also developed time-efficient algorithms for the very symmetric graphs of cliques and cycles, paying only an additional cost of o(n) random bits. The primary steps of our algorithms are of independent interest. At first glance, it seems that using one random bit per node, any algorithm can distinguish only two sets of nodes: those with 0 and those with 1. Our algorithms manage to partition the nodes into more than two sets with high probability. In some sense, they perform the task of a "distributed pseudorandom generator", for example, one of our algorithms turns n bits, one per node, into n unique (with high probability) numbers. Even though a complete graph looks very symmetric, the algorithms explore interesting asymmetries inherent in any n permutations (of n values each), if each describes the assignment (by the adversary) of ports in a node to edges leading to neighbors. Finally, we show how to transform any randomized algorithm that generates xn+o(n) random bits in total to one where each node generates at most x+1 bits. Our results apply to both synchronous and asynchronous networks.
Cite as

Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, and Shay Kutten. What Is the Minimum Number of Random Bits Required for Computability and Efficiency in Anonymous Networks?. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 353, pp. 41:1-41:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kowalski_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.41,
  author =	{Kowalski, Dariusz R. and Krysta, Piotr and Kutten, Shay},
  title =	{{What Is the Minimum Number of Random Bits Required for Computability and Efficiency in Anonymous Networks?}},
  booktitle =	{Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-397-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{353},
  editor =	{Ene, Alina and Chattopadhyay, Eshan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-244071},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed computability, Anonymous Networks, Randomness, Leader Election}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.141
House Markets with Matroid and Knapsack Constraints

Authors: Piotr Krysta and Jinshan Zhang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)

Abstract
Classical online bipartite matching problem and its generalizations are central algorithmic optimization problems. The second related line of research is in the area of algorithmic mechanism design, referring to the broad class of house allocation or assignment problems. We introduce a single framework that unifies and generalizes these two streams of models. Our generalizations allow for arbitrary matroid constraints or knapsack constraints at every object in the allocation problem. We design and analyze approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for this framework. Our algorithms have best possible approximation guarantees for most of the special instantiations of this framework, and are strong generalizations of the previous known results.
Cite as

Piotr Krysta and Jinshan Zhang. House Markets with Matroid and Knapsack Constraints. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 141:1-141:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{krysta_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.141,
  author =	{Krysta, Piotr and Zhang, Jinshan},
  title =	{{House Markets with Matroid and Knapsack Constraints}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{141:1--141:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.141},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-62853},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.141},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic mechanism design; Approximation algorithms; Matching under preferences; Matroid and knapsack constraints}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2008.1340
Stackelberg Network Pricing Games

Authors: Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, and Piotr Krysta

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 1, 25th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (2008)

Abstract
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions, and the problem is to find revenue maximizing prices. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a $(1+varepsilon) log m$-approximation for any $varepsilon >0$. This can be extended to provide a $(1+varepsilon )(log k + log m)$-approximation for the general problem and $k$ followers. The latter result is essentially best possible, as the problem is shown to be hard to approximate within $mathcal{O(log^varepsilon k + log^varepsilon m)$. If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides a $(1+varepsilon )m^2$-approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within $mathcal{O(m^varepsilon)$ for some $varepsilon >0$. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. Our results can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers.
Cite as

Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, and Piotr Krysta. Stackelberg Network Pricing Games. In 25th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 1, pp. 133-142, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{briest_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2008.1340,
  author =	{Briest, Patrick and Hoefer, Martin and Krysta, Piotr},
  title =	{{Stackelberg Network Pricing Games}},
  booktitle =	{25th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science},
  pages =	{133--142},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-06-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{1},
  editor =	{Albers, Susanne and Weil, Pascal},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2008.1340},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-13406},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2008.1340},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stackelberg Games, Algorithmic Pricing, Approximation Algorithms, Inapproximability.}
}
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