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Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331)

Authors: Edith Elkind, Judy Goldsmith, Anja Rey, and Jörg Rothe

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 11, Issue 7 (2021)

Abstract

There are many situations in which individuals will choose to act as a group, or coalition. Examples include social clubs, political parties, partnership formation, and legislative voting. Coalition formation games are a class of cooperative games where the aim is to partition a set of agents into coalitions, according to some criteria, such as coalitional stability or maximization of social welfare. In our seminar we discussed applications, results, and new directions of research in the field of coalition formation games.

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Edith Elkind, Judy Goldsmith, Anja Rey, and Jörg Rothe. Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 11, Issue 7, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@Article{elkind_et_al:DagRep.11.7.1,
  author =	{Elkind, Edith and Goldsmith, Judy and Rey, Anja and Rothe, J\"{o}rg},
  title =	{{Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331)}},
  pages =	{1--15},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{11},
  number =	{7},
  editor =	{Elkind, Edith and Goldsmith, Judy and Rey, Anja and Rothe, J\"{o}rg},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.11.7.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-155885},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.11.7.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coalition Formation, Cooperative Games}
}

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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.80

Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games

Authors: Anja Rey and Jörg Rothe

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 58, 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016)

Abstract

Inspired by the study of control scenarios in elections and complementing manipulation and bribery settings in cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce the notion of structural control in weighted voting games. We model two types of influence, adding players to and deleting players from a game, with goals such as increasing a given player's Shapley-Shubik or probabilistic Penrose-Banzhaf index in relation to the original game. We study the computational complexity of the problems of whether such structural changes can achieve the desired effect.

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Anja Rey and Jörg Rothe. Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games. In 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 58, pp. 80:1-80:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{rey_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.80,
  author =	{Rey, Anja and Rothe, J\"{o}rg},
  title =	{{Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games}},
  booktitle =	{41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016)},
  pages =	{80:1--80:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-016-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{58},
  editor =	{Faliszewski, Piotr and Muscholl, Anca and Niedermeier, Rolf},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.80},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-64883},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.80},
  annote =	{Keywords: algorithmic games theory, weighted voting games, structural control, power indices, computational complexity}
}

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Documents authored by Rey, Anja

Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331)

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Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games

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