Search Results

Documents authored by Rogers, Alex


Document
Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets

Authors: Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, and Nicholas R. Jennings

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)


Abstract
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids.

Cite as

Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{gerding_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.21,
  author =	{Gerding, Enrico H. and Rogers, Alex and Dash, Rajdeep K. and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
  title =	{{Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9979},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Competing Sellers, Shill Bidding, Auction Fees, Reserve Price}
}
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail