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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2022.4

Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search

Authors: Shuchi Chawla, Rojin Rezvan, and Nathaniel Sauerberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 218, 3rd Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2022)

Abstract

We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadeesan [Chawla and Jagadeesan, 2022], who considered the special case of a single slot. We consider sponsored search settings with multiple slots and the standard model of click through rates that are multiplicatively separable into an advertiser-specific component and a slot-specific component. When similar users have similar advertiser-specific click through rates, our auctions achieve the same near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality as in [Chawla and Jagadeesan, 2022]. When similar users can have different advertiser-specific preferences, we show that a preference-based fairness guarantee holds. Finally, we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing payments for our auctions as well as those in previous work, resolving another open direction from [Chawla and Jagadeesan, 2022].

Cite as

Shuchi Chawla, Rojin Rezvan, and Nathaniel Sauerberg. Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search. In 3rd Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 218, pp. 4:1-4:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{chawla_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2022.4,
  author =	{Chawla, Shuchi and Rezvan, Rojin and Sauerberg, Nathaniel},
  title =	{{Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search}},
  booktitle =	{3rd Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2022)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-226-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{218},
  editor =	{Celis, L. Elisa},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2022.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-165272},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2022.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: algorithmic fairness, advertising auctions, and individual fairness}
}

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Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search

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