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Documents authored by Stan, Daniel

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2024.46
Concurrent Stochastic Lossy Channel Games

Authors: Daniel Stan, Muhammad Najib, Anthony Widjaja Lin, and Parosh Aziz Abdulla

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 288, 32nd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2024)

Abstract
Concurrent stochastic games are an important formalism for the rational verification of probabilistic multi-agent systems, which involves verifying whether a temporal logic property is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of such systems. In this work, we study the rational verification of probabilistic multi-agent systems where agents can cooperate by communicating over unbounded lossy channels. To model such systems, we present concurrent stochastic lossy channel games (CSLCG) and employ an equilibrium concept from cooperative game theory known as the core, which is the most fundamental and widely studied cooperative equilibrium concept. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we show that the rational verification problem is undecidable for systems whose agents have almost-sure LTL objectives. Second, we provide a decidable fragment of such a class of objectives that subsumes almost-sure reachability and safety. Our techniques involve reductions to solving infinite-state zero-sum games with conjunctions of qualitative objectives. To the best of our knowledge, our result represents the first decidability result on the rational verification of stochastic multi-agent systems on infinite arenas.
Cite as

Daniel Stan, Muhammad Najib, Anthony Widjaja Lin, and Parosh Aziz Abdulla. Concurrent Stochastic Lossy Channel Games. In 32nd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 288, pp. 46:1-46:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{stan_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2024.46,
  author =	{Stan, Daniel and Najib, Muhammad and Lin, Anthony Widjaja and Abdulla, Parosh Aziz},
  title =	{{Concurrent Stochastic Lossy Channel Games}},
  booktitle =	{32nd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2024)},
  pages =	{46:1--46:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-310-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{288},
  editor =	{Murano, Aniello and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2024.46},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-196894},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2024.46},
  annote =	{Keywords: concurrent, games, stochastic, lossy channels, wqo, finite attractor property, cooperative, core, Nash equilibrium}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.106
Reachability in Networks of Register Protocols under Stochastic Schedulers

Authors: Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, Mickael Randour, Arnaud Sangnier, and Daniel Stan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)

Abstract
We study the almost-sure reachability problem in a distributed system obtained as the asynchronous composition of N copies (called processes) of the same automaton (called protocol), that can communicate via a shared register with finite domain. The automaton has two types of transitions: write-transitions update the value of the register, while read-transitions move to a new state depending on the content of the register. Non-determinism is resolved by a stochastic scheduler. Given a protocol, we focus on almost-sure reachability of a target state by one of the processes. The answer to this problem naturally depends on the number N of processes. However, we prove that our setting has a cut-off property: the answer to the almost-sure reachability problem is constant when N is large enough; we then develop an EXPSPACE algorithm deciding whether this constant answer is positive or negative.
Cite as

Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, Mickael Randour, Arnaud Sangnier, and Daniel Stan. Reachability in Networks of Register Protocols under Stochastic Schedulers. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 106:1-106:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{bouyer_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.106,
  author =	{Bouyer, Patricia and Markey, Nicolas and Randour, Mickael and Sangnier, Arnaud and Stan, Daniel},
  title =	{{Reachability in Networks of Register Protocols under Stochastic Schedulers}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{106:1--106:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.106},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-62416},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.106},
  annote =	{Keywords: Networks of Processes, Parametrized Systems, Stochastic Scheduler, Almost-sure Reachability, Cut-Off Property}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.351
Mixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Terminal-Reward Games

Authors: Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, and Daniel Stan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 29, 34th International Conference on Foundation of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2014)

Abstract
We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability objectives). This has to be compared with the undecidability result by Ummels and Wojtczak for turn-based games which requires 14 players and general rewards. Our proof has various interesting consequences: (i) the undecidability of the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a constraint on the social welfare; (ii) the undecidability of the existence of an (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium in concurrent games with terminal-reward payoffs.
Cite as

Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, and Daniel Stan. Mixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Terminal-Reward Games. In 34th International Conference on Foundation of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2014). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 29, pp. 351-363, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

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@InProceedings{bouyer_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.351,
  author =	{Bouyer, Patricia and Markey, Nicolas and Stan, Daniel},
  title =	{{Mixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Terminal-Reward Games}},
  booktitle =	{34th International Conference on Foundation of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2014)},
  pages =	{351--363},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-77-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{29},
  editor =	{Raman, Venkatesh and Suresh, S. P.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.351},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-48550},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.351},
  annote =	{Keywords: concurrent games, randomized strategy, Nash equilibria, undecidability}
}
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