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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.7

Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing in Non-Compartmentalized Models

Authors: Fuchun Lin, Mahdi Cheraghchi, Venkatesan Guruswami, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Huaxiong Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 163, 1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020)

Abstract

Leakage-resilient secret sharing has mostly been studied in the compartmentalized models, where a leakage oracle can arbitrarily leak bounded number of bits from all shares, provided that the oracle only has access to a bounded number of shares when the leakage is taking place. We start a systematic study of leakage-resilient secret sharing against global leakage, where the leakage oracle can access the full set of shares simultaneously, but the access is restricted to a special class of leakage functions. More concretely, the adversary can corrupt several players and obtain their shares, as well as applying a leakage function from a specific class to the full share vector. We explicitly construct such leakage-resilient secret sharing with respect to affine leakage functions and low-degree multi-variate polynomial leakage functions, respectively. For affine leakage functions, we obtain schemes with threshold access structure that are leakage-resilient as long as there is a substantial difference between the total amount of information obtained by the adversary, through corrupting individual players and leaking from the full share vector, and the amount that the reconstruction algorithm requires for reconstructing the secret. Furthermore, if we assume the adversary is non-adaptive, we can even make the secret length asymptotically equal to the difference, as the share length grows. Specifically, we have a threshold scheme with parameters similar to Shamir’s scheme and is leakage-resilient against affine leakage. For multi-variate polynomial leakage functions with degree bigger than one, our constructions here only yield ramp schemes that are leakage-resilient against such leakage. Finally, as a result of independent interest, we show that our approach to leakage-resilient secret sharing also yields a competitive scheme compared with the state-of-the-art construction in the compartmentalized models.

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Fuchun Lin, Mahdi Cheraghchi, Venkatesan Guruswami, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Huaxiong Wang. Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing in Non-Compartmentalized Models. In 1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 163, pp. 7:1-7:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{lin_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2020.7,
  author =	{Lin, Fuchun and Cheraghchi, Mahdi and Guruswami, Venkatesan and Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh and Wang, Huaxiong},
  title =	{{Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing in Non-Compartmentalized Models}},
  booktitle =	{1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-151-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{163},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael and Smith, Adam D. and Wichs, Daniel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-121124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Leakage-resilient cryptography, Secret sharing scheme, Randomness extractor}
}

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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.53

Secret Sharing with Binary Shares

Authors: Fuchun Lin, Mahdi Cheraghchi, Venkatesan Guruswami, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Huaxiong Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 124, 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)

Abstract

Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides an efficient method for encoding a secret of arbitrary length l among any N <= 2^l players such that for a threshold parameter t, (i) the knowledge of any t shares does not reveal any information about the secret and, (ii) any choice of t+1 shares fully reveals the secret. It is known that any such threshold secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length l, and in this sense Shamir's scheme is optimal. The more general notion of ramp schemes requires the reconstruction of secret from any t+g shares, for a positive integer gap parameter g. Ramp secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length l/g. Other than the bound related to secret length l, the share lengths of ramp schemes can not go below a quantity that depends only on the gap ratio g/N. In this work, we study secret sharing in the extremal case of bit-long shares and arbitrarily small gap ratio g/N, where standard ramp secret sharing becomes impossible. We show, however, that a slightly relaxed but equally effective notion of semantic security for the secret, and negligible reconstruction error probability, eliminate the impossibility. Moreover, we provide explicit constructions of such schemes. One of the consequences of our relaxation is that, unlike standard ramp schemes with perfect secrecy, adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries need different analysis and construction. For non-adaptive adversaries, we explicitly construct secret sharing schemes that provide secrecy against any tau fraction of observed shares, and reconstruction from any rho fraction of shares, for any choices of 0 <= tau < rho <= 1. Our construction achieves secret length N(rho-tau-o(1)), which we show to be optimal. For adaptive adversaries, we construct explicit schemes attaining a secret length Omega(N(rho-tau)). We discuss our results and open questions.

Cite as

Fuchun Lin, Mahdi Cheraghchi, Venkatesan Guruswami, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Huaxiong Wang. Secret Sharing with Binary Shares. In 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 124, pp. 53:1-53:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{lin_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.53,
  author =	{Lin, Fuchun and Cheraghchi, Mahdi and Guruswami, Venkatesan and Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh and Wang, Huaxiong},
  title =	{{Secret Sharing with Binary Shares}},
  booktitle =	{10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)},
  pages =	{53:1--53:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-095-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{124},
  editor =	{Blum, Avrim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.53},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-101461},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.53},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secret sharing scheme, Wiretap channel}
}

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Documents authored by Wang, Huaxiong

Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing in Non-Compartmentalized Models

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Secret Sharing with Binary Shares

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