Search Results

Documents authored by Wu, Fei


Document
To Wait or to Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains

Authors: Fei Wu and Burak Öz

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 395, 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)


Abstract
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on high-throughput blockchains can be captured through targeted search, where bots identify opportunities off-chain and submit route-committed transactions, or through probabilistic search, where bots submit repeated attempts that discover opportunities during on-chain execution. This distinction has direct implications for spam, blockspace consumption, and protocol revenue. We model how ordering granularity, fee floors, and opportunity-access shocks shape competition between these architectures. Using cyclic arbitrage data on Base from June 2025 to February 2026, we develop a trace-level classifier for search architectures and show that the resulting labels correspond to distinct execution behavior. In our sample, probabilistic search accounts for only 23% of arbitrage activity but produces 95% of spam and consumes 20% of Base gas. We test the model across three episodes: Flashblocks selects against broad on-chain probabilistic scanners; token-launch opportunity shocks temporarily revive probabilistic search; and higher fee floors select against probabilistic bots whose opportunity flow cannot sustain repeated attempts. After Base’s configuration changes, protocol revenue shifts toward successful arbitrages and away from spam, probabilistic bots pay higher priority fees, and spam consumes a smaller share of blockspace.

Cite as

Fei Wu and Burak Öz. To Wait or to Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains. In 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 395, pp. 24:1-24:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{wu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.24,
  author =	{Wu, Fei and \"{O}z, Burak},
  title =	{{To Wait or to Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-451-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{395},
  editor =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278788},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Maximal Extractable Value, cyclic arbitrage, spam, Base}
}
Document
The Price of Decentralization in Block Building

Authors: Burak Öz, Fei Wu, Luis Correia, Sen Yang, Bruno Mazorra, and Stefanos Leonardos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 395, 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)


Abstract
Decentralized block building mechanisms replace the monopoly of a single proposer with multiple builders. However, their censorship-resistance and fair-access benefits depend not only on the number of builders, but also on where builders are geographically positioned to provide transaction coverage. We study this tension between builder location choice, user transaction coverage, and utility concentration by modeling decentralized block building as a stochastic coverage game. Builders choose regions, information sources emit transactions over a block construction round, and latency determines whether a transaction is received before the deadline. We show that the game is an exact potential game and admits a pure Nash equilibrium. We prove an asymptotically tight factor-2 bound on the Price of Anarchy, which we interpret as the price of decentralization from uncoordinated builder placement. We also study builder utility concentration, showing that the lowest-utility builder earns at least half of the highest-utility builder’s payoff, and the utility-share HHI is at most 12.5% above the egalitarian benchmark. We complement the theory with simulations under richer latency and source environments and show that slot times, builder participation, and reward-sharing rules are important protocol design choices that can shape the price of decentralization.

Cite as

Burak Öz, Fei Wu, Luis Correia, Sen Yang, Bruno Mazorra, and Stefanos Leonardos. The Price of Decentralization in Block Building. In 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 395, pp. 25:1-25:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{oz_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.25,
  author =	{\"{O}z, Burak and Wu, Fei and Correia, Luis and Yang, Sen and Mazorra, Bruno and Leonardos, Stefanos},
  title =	{{The Price of Decentralization in Block Building}},
  booktitle =	{8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
  pages =	{25:1--25:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-451-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{395},
  editor =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.25},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278791},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.25},
  annote =	{Keywords: decentralization, block building, potential game, price of anarchy}
}
Document
Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest

Authors: Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)


Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications for Ethereum’s decentralization.

Cite as

Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai. Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 26:1-26:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{wu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26,
  author =	{Wu, Fei and Sui, Danning and Thiery, Thomas and Pai, Mallesh},
  title =	{{Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247450},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Finance, Maximal Extractable Value, CEX-DEX arbitrages}
}

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail