2 Search Results for "Karthikeyan, Harish"


Document
On Seedless PRNGs and Premature Next

Authors: Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis, Harish Karthikeyan, Noah Stephens-Davidowitz, and Stefano Tessaro

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 230, 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)


Abstract
Pseudorandom number generators with input (PRNGs) are cryptographic algorithms that generate pseudorandom bits from accumulated entropic inputs (e.g., keystrokes, interrupt timings, etc.). This paper studies in particular PRNGs that are secure against premature next attacks (Kelsey et al., FSE '98), a class of attacks leveraging the fact that a PRNG may produce an output (which could be seen by an adversary!) before enough entropy has been accumulated. Practical designs adopt either unsound entropy-estimation methods to prevent such attacks (as in Linux’s /dev/random) or sophisticated pool-based approaches as in Yarrow (MacOS/FreeBSD) and Fortuna (Windows). The only prior theoretical study of premature next attacks (Dodis et al., Algorithmica '17) considers either a seeded setting or assumes constant entropy rate, and thus falls short of providing and validating practical designs. Assuming the availability of random seed is particularly problematic, first because this requires us to somehow generate a random seed without using our PRNG, but also because we must ensure that the entropy inputs to the PRNG remain independent of the seed. Indeed, all practical designs are seedless. However, prior works on seedless PRNGs (Coretti et al., CRYPTO '19; Dodis et al., ITC '21, CRYPTO'21) do not consider premature next attacks. The main goal of this paper is to investigate the feasibility of theoretically sound seedless PRNGs that are secure against premature next attacks. To this end, we make the following contributions: 1) We prove that it is impossible to achieve seedless PRNGs that are secure against premature-next attacks, even in a rather weak model. Namely, the impossibility holds even when the entropic inputs to the PRNG are independent. In particular, our impossibility result holds in settings where seedless PRNGs are otherwise possible. 2) Given the above impossibility result, we investigate whether existing seedless pool-based approaches meant to overcome premature next attacks in practical designs provide meaningful guarantees in certain settings. Specifically, we show the following. 3) We introduce a natural condition on the entropic input and prove that it implies security of the round-robin entropy accumulation PRNG used by Windows 10, called Fortuna. Intuitively, our condition requires the input entropy "not to vary too wildly" within a given round-robin round. 4) We prove that the "root pool" approach (also used in Windows 10) is secure for general entropy inputs, provided that the system’s state is not compromised after system startup.

Cite as

Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis, Harish Karthikeyan, Noah Stephens-Davidowitz, and Stefano Tessaro. On Seedless PRNGs and Premature Next. In 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 230, pp. 9:1-9:20, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


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@InProceedings{coretti_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2022.9,
  author =	{Coretti, Sandro and Dodis, Yevgeniy and Karthikeyan, Harish and Stephens-Davidowitz, Noah and Tessaro, Stefano},
  title =	{{On Seedless PRNGs and Premature Next}},
  booktitle =	{3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-238-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{230},
  editor =	{Dachman-Soled, Dana},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164870},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: seedless PRNGs, pseudorandom number generators, PRNG, Fortuna, premature next}
}
Document
Small-Box Cryptography

Authors: Yevgeniy Dodis, Harish Karthikeyan, and Daniel Wichs

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)


Abstract
One of the ultimate goals of symmetric-key cryptography is to find a rigorous theoretical framework for building block ciphers from small components, such as cryptographic S-boxes, and then argue why iterating such small components for sufficiently many rounds would yield a secure construction. Unfortunately, a fundamental obstacle towards reaching this goal comes from the fact that traditional security proofs cannot get security beyond 2^{-n}, where n is the size of the corresponding component. As a result, prior provably secure approaches - which we call "big-box cryptography" - always made n larger than the security parameter, which led to several problems: (a) the design was too coarse to really explain practical constructions, as (arguably) the most interesting design choices happening when instantiating such "big-boxes" were completely abstracted out; (b) the theoretically predicted number of rounds for the security of this approach was always dramatically smaller than in reality, where the "big-box" building block could not be made as ideal as required by the proof. For example, Even-Mansour (and, more generally, key-alternating) ciphers completely ignored the substitution-permutation network (SPN) paradigm which is at the heart of most real-world implementations of such ciphers. In this work, we introduce a novel paradigm for justifying the security of existing block ciphers, which we call small-box cryptography. Unlike the "big-box" paradigm, it allows one to go much deeper inside the existing block cipher constructions, by only idealizing a small (and, hence, realistic!) building block of very small size n, such as an 8-to-32-bit S-box. It then introduces a clean and rigorous mixture of proofs and hardness conjectures which allow one to lift traditional, and seemingly meaningless, "at most 2^{-n}" security proofs for reduced-round idealized variants of the existing block ciphers, into meaningful, full-round security justifications of the actual ciphers used in the real world. We then apply our framework to the analysis of SPN ciphers (e.g, generalizations of AES), getting quite reasonable and plausible concrete hardness estimates for the resulting ciphers. We also apply our framework to the design of stream ciphers. Here, however, we focus on the simplicity of the resulting construction, for which we managed to find a direct "big-box"-style security justification, under a well studied and widely believed eXact Linear Parity with Noise (XLPN) assumption. Overall, we hope that our work will initiate many follow-up results in the area of small-box cryptography.

Cite as

Yevgeniy Dodis, Harish Karthikeyan, and Daniel Wichs. Small-Box Cryptography. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 215, pp. 56:1-56:25, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{dodis_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.56,
  author =	{Dodis, Yevgeniy and Karthikeyan, Harish and Wichs, Daniel},
  title =	{{Small-Box Cryptography}},
  booktitle =	{13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)},
  pages =	{56:1--56:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-217-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{215},
  editor =	{Braverman, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.56},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-156527},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.56},
  annote =	{Keywords: Block Ciphers, S-Box, Cryptography}
}
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