3 Search Results for "Morgan, Carroll"

Document

Survey

Semantic Web: Past, Present, and Future

Authors: Ansgar Scherp, Gerd Groener, Petr Škoda, Katja Hose, and Maria-Esther Vidal

Published in: TGDK, Volume 2, Issue 1 (2024): Special Issue on Trends in Graph Data and Knowledge - Part 2. Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 2, Issue 1

Abstract

Ever since the vision was formulated, the Semantic Web has inspired many generations of innovations. Semantic technologies have been used to share vast amounts of information on the Web, enhance them with semantics to give them meaning, and enable inference and reasoning on them. Throughout the years, semantic technologies, and in particular knowledge graphs, have been used in search engines, data integration, enterprise settings, and machine learning. In this paper, we recap the classical concepts and foundations of the Semantic Web as well as modern and recent concepts and applications, building upon these foundations. The classical topics we cover include knowledge representation, creating and validating knowledge on the Web, reasoning and linking, and distributed querying. We enhance this classical view of the so-called "Semantic Web Layer Cake" with an update of recent concepts that include provenance, security and trust, as well as a discussion of practical impacts from industry-led contributions. We conclude with an outlook on the future directions of the Semantic Web. This is a living document. If you like to contribute, please contact the first author and visit: https://github.com/ascherp/semantic-web-primer

Cite as

Ansgar Scherp, Gerd Groener, Petr Škoda, Katja Hose, and Maria-Esther Vidal. Semantic Web: Past, Present, and Future. In Special Issue on Trends in Graph Data and Knowledge - Part 2. Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 2, Issue 1, pp. 3:1-3:37, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@Article{scherp_et_al:TGDK.2.1.3,
  author =	{Scherp, Ansgar and Groener, Gerd and \v{S}koda, Petr and Hose, Katja and Vidal, Maria-Esther},
  title =	{{Semantic Web: Past, Present, and Future}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{3:1--3:37},
  ISSN =	{2942-7517},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{2},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.2.1.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-198607},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.2.1.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Linked Open Data, Semantic Web Graphs, Knowledge Graphs}
}

Document

Invited Talk

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.2

How to Develop an Intuition for Risk... and Other Invisible Phenomena (Invited Talk)

Authors: Natasha Fernandes, Annabelle McIver, and Carroll Morgan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 216, 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022)

Abstract

The study of quantitative risk in security systems is often based around complex and subtle mathematical ideas involving probabilities. The notations for these ideas can pose a communication barrier between collaborating researchers even when those researchers are working within a similar framework. This paper describes the use of geometrical representation and reasoning as a way to share ideas using the minimum of notation so as to build intuition about what kinds of properties might or might not be true. We describe a faithful geometrical setting for the channel model of quantitative information flow (QIF) and demonstrate how it can facilitate "proofs without words" for problems in the QIF setting.

Cite as

Natasha Fernandes, Annabelle McIver, and Carroll Morgan. How to Develop an Intuition for Risk... and Other Invisible Phenomena (Invited Talk). In 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 216, pp. 2:1-2:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{fernandes_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2022.2,
  author =	{Fernandes, Natasha and McIver, Annabelle and Morgan, Carroll},
  title =	{{How to Develop an Intuition for Risk... and Other Invisible Phenomena}},
  booktitle =	{30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-218-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{216},
  editor =	{Manea, Florin and Simpson, Alex},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157227},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Geometry, Quantitative Information Flow, Proof, Explainability, Privacy}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27

Verifying That a Compiler Preserves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security

Authors: Robert Sison and Toby Murray

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 141, 10th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2019)

Abstract

It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is complicated when programs enforce value-dependent information-flow security properties (in which classification of locations can vary depending on values in other locations) and complicated further when programs exploit shared-variable concurrency. Prior work has formally defined a notion of concurrency-aware refinement for preserving value-dependent security properties. However, that notion is considerably more complex than standard refinement definitions typically applied in the verification of semantics preservation by compilers. To date it remains unclear whether it can be applied to a realistic compiler, because there exist no general decomposition principles for separating it into smaller, more familiar, proof obligations. In this work, we provide such a decomposition principle, which we show can almost halve the complexity of proving secure refinement. Further, we demonstrate its applicability to secure compilation, by proving in Isabelle/HOL the preservation of value-dependent security by a proof-of-concept compiler from an imperative While language to a generic RISC-style assembly language, for programs with shared-memory concurrency mediated by locking primitives. Finally, we execute our compiler in Isabelle on a While language model of the Cross Domain Desktop Compositor, demonstrating to our knowledge the first use of a compiler verification result to carry an information-flow security property down to the assembly-level model of a non-trivial concurrent program.

Cite as

Robert Sison and Toby Murray. Verifying That a Compiler Preserves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security. In 10th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 141, pp. 27:1-27:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{sison_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27,
  author =	{Sison, Robert and Murray, Toby},
  title =	{{Verifying That a Compiler Preserves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security}},
  booktitle =	{10th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2019)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-122-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{141},
  editor =	{Harrison, John and O'Leary, John and Tolmach, Andrew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-110829},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure compilation, Information flow security, Concurrency, Verification}
}

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1 Fernandes, Natasha
1 Groener, Gerd
1 Hose, Katja
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1 Morgan, Carroll
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1 Computing methodologies → Knowledge representation and reasoning
1 Computing methodologies → Ontology engineering
1 Information systems → Markup languages
1 Information systems → Semantic web description languages
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1 Concurrency
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