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How to Develop an Intuition for Risk... and Other Invisible Phenomena (Invited Talk)

Authors Natasha Fernandes, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan

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Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Security and privacy → Formal methods and theory of security
Keywords
  • Geometry
  • Quantitative Information Flow
  • Proof
  • Explainability
  • Privacy

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Abstract

The study of quantitative risk in security systems is often based around complex and subtle mathematical ideas involving probabilities. The notations for these ideas can pose a communication barrier between collaborating researchers even when those researchers are working within a similar framework.
This paper describes the use of geometrical representation and reasoning as a way to share ideas using the minimum of notation so as to build intuition about what kinds of properties might or might not be true. We describe a faithful geometrical setting for the channel model of quantitative information flow (QIF) and demonstrate how it can facilitate "proofs without words" for problems in the QIF setting.

Cite As Get BibTex

Natasha Fernandes, Annabelle McIver, and Carroll Morgan. How to Develop an Intuition for Risk... and Other Invisible Phenomena (Invited Talk). In 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 216, pp. 2:1-2:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.2

Author Details

Natasha Fernandes
  • School of Engineering and IT, UNSW Canberra, Australia
Annabelle McIver
  • Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Carroll Morgan
  • School of Computer Science and Engineering, UNSW, Sydney, Australia

References

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