5 Search Results for "Pietrzak, Krzysztof"


Document
Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering Attacks

Authors: Orestis Alpos, Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Michelle Yeo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 286, 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)


Abstract
Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV attacks. In this paper, we address the issue of sandwich attacks by providing a construction that takes as input a blockchain protocol and outputs a new blockchain protocol with the same security but in which sandwich attacks are not profitable. Furthermore, our protocol is fully decentralized with no trusted third parties or heavy cryptography primitives and carries a linear increase in latency and minimum computation overhead.

Cite as

Orestis Alpos, Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Michelle Yeo. Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering Attacks. In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 286, pp. 12:1-12:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{alpos_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12,
  author =	{Alpos, Orestis and Amores-Sesar, Ignacio and Cachin, Christian and Yeo, Michelle},
  title =	{{Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering Attacks}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-308-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{286},
  editor =	{Bessani, Alysson and D\'{e}fago, Xavier and Nakamura, Junya and Wada, Koichi and Yamauchi, Yukiko},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195029},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Consensus, MEV, Byzantine behavior, Rational behavior}
}
Document
Efficiently Testable Circuits

Authors: Mirza Ahad Baig, Suvradip Chakraborty, Stefan Dziembowski, Małgorzata Gałązka, Tomasz Lizurej, and Krzysztof Pietrzak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)


Abstract
In this work, we put forward the notion of "efficiently testable circuits" and provide circuit compilers that transform any circuit into an efficiently testable one. Informally, a circuit is testable if one can detect tampering with the circuit by evaluating it on a small number of inputs from some test set. Our technical contribution is a compiler that transforms any circuit C into a testable circuit (Ĉ,𝕋̂) for which we can detect arbitrary tampering with all wires in Ĉ. The notion of a testable circuit is weaker or incomparable to existing notions of tamper-resilience, which aim to detect or even correct for errors introduced by tampering during every query, but our new notion is interesting in several settings, and we achieve security against much more general tampering classes - like tampering with all wires - with very modest overhead. Concretely, starting from a circuit C of size n and depth d, for any L (think of L as a small constant, say L = 4), we get a testable (Ĉ,𝕋̂) where Ĉ is of size ≈ 12n and depth d+log(n)+L⋅ n^{1/L}. The test set 𝕋̂ is of size 4⋅ 2^L. The number of extra input and output wires (i.e., pins) we need to add for the testing is 3+L and 2^L, respectively.

Cite as

Mirza Ahad Baig, Suvradip Chakraborty, Stefan Dziembowski, Małgorzata Gałązka, Tomasz Lizurej, and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Efficiently Testable Circuits. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 10:1-10:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


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@InProceedings{baig_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.10,
  author =	{Baig, Mirza Ahad and Chakraborty, Suvradip and Dziembowski, Stefan and Ga{\l}\k{a}zka, Ma{\l}gorzata and Lizurej, Tomasz and Pietrzak, Krzysztof},
  title =	{{Efficiently Testable Circuits}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175130},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: circuit compilers, circuit integrity, circuit testing}
}
Document
Proofs of Catalytic Space

Authors: Krzysztof Pietrzak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 124, 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)


Abstract
Proofs of space (PoS) [Dziembowski et al., CRYPTO'15] are proof systems where a prover can convince a verifier that he "wastes" disk space. PoS were introduced as a more ecological and economical replacement for proofs of work which are currently used to secure blockchains like Bitcoin. In this work we investigate extensions of PoS which allow the prover to embed useful data into the dedicated space, which later can be recovered. Our first contribution is a security proof for the original PoS from CRYPTO'15 in the random oracle model (the original proof only applied to a restricted class of adversaries which can store a subset of the data an honest prover would store). When this PoS is instantiated with recent constructions of maximally depth robust graphs, our proof implies basically optimal security. As a second contribution we show three different extensions of this PoS where useful data can be embedded into the space required by the prover. Our security proof for the PoS extends (non-trivially) to these constructions. We discuss how some of these variants can be used as proofs of catalytic space (PoCS), a notion we put forward in this work, and which basically is a PoS where most of the space required by the prover can be used to backup useful data. Finally we discuss how one of the extensions is a candidate construction for a proof of replication (PoR), a proof system recently suggested in the Filecoin whitepaper.

Cite as

Krzysztof Pietrzak. Proofs of Catalytic Space. In 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 124, pp. 59:1-59:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)


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@InProceedings{pietrzak:LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.59,
  author =	{Pietrzak, Krzysztof},
  title =	{{Proofs of Catalytic Space}},
  booktitle =	{10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)},
  pages =	{59:1--59:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-095-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{124},
  editor =	{Blum, Avrim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.59},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-101525},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.59},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proofs of Space, Proofs of Replication, Blockchains}
}
Document
Simple Verifiable Delay Functions

Authors: Krzysztof Pietrzak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 124, 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)


Abstract
We construct a verifiable delay function (VDF) by showing how the Rivest-Shamir-Wagner time-lock puzzle can be made publicly verifiable. Concretely, we give a statistically sound public-coin protocol to prove that a tuple (N,x,T,y) satisfies y=x^{2^T} mod N where the prover doesn't know the factorization of N and its running time is dominated by solving the puzzle, that is, compute x^{2^T}, which is conjectured to require T sequential squarings. To get a VDF we make this protocol non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The motivation for this work comes from the Chia blockchain design, which uses a VDF as a key ingredient. For typical parameters (T <=2^{40},N=2048), our proofs are of size around 10KB, verification cost around three RSA exponentiations and computing the proof is 8000 times faster than solving the puzzle even without any parallelism.

Cite as

Krzysztof Pietrzak. Simple Verifiable Delay Functions. In 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 124, pp. 60:1-60:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)


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@InProceedings{pietrzak:LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.60,
  author =	{Pietrzak, Krzysztof},
  title =	{{Simple Verifiable Delay Functions}},
  booktitle =	{10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)},
  pages =	{60:1--60:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-095-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{124},
  editor =	{Blum, Avrim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.60},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-101537},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.60},
  annote =	{Keywords: Verifiable delay functions, Time-lock puzzles}
}
Document
Non-Uniform Attacks Against Pseudoentropy

Authors: Krzysztof Pietrzak and Maciej Skorski

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)


Abstract
De, Trevisan and Tulsiani [CRYPTO 2010] show that every distribution over n-bit strings which has constant statistical distance to uniform (e.g., the output of a pseudorandom generator mapping n-1 to n bit strings), can be distinguished from the uniform distribution with advantage epsilon by a circuit of size O( 2^n epsilon^2). We generalize this result, showing that a distribution which has less than k bits of min-entropy, can be distinguished from any distribution with k bits of delta-smooth min-entropy with advantage epsilon by a circuit of size O(2^k epsilon^2/delta^2). As a special case, this implies that any distribution with support at most 2^k (e.g., the output of a pseudoentropy generator mapping k to n bit strings) can be distinguished from any given distribution with min-entropy k+1 with advantage epsilon by a circuit of size O(2^k epsilon^2). Our result thus shows that pseudoentropy distributions face basically the same non-uniform attacks as pseudorandom distributions.

Cite as

Krzysztof Pietrzak and Maciej Skorski. Non-Uniform Attacks Against Pseudoentropy. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 39:1-39:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{pietrzak_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.39,
  author =	{Pietrzak, Krzysztof and Skorski, Maciej},
  title =	{{Non-Uniform Attacks Against Pseudoentropy}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{39:1--39:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.39},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74738},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.39},
  annote =	{Keywords: pseudoentropy, non-uniform attacks}
}
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