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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11579
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1157/
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Elmaghraby, Wedad ; Larson, Nathan

Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach

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Abstract

Advances in information technology and computational power have opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices. While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions, it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters have the greatest impact on the performance on cost and efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via analytical and experimental methods.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{elmaghraby_et_al:DSP:2007:1157,
  author =	{Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson},
  title =	{Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz },
  number =	{07271},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1157},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders}
}

Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders
Seminar: 07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet
Issue Date: 2007
Date of publication: 02.10.2007


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