DagSemProc.07271.5.pdf
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Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2007-10-02
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Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson. Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5
Abstract
Advances in information technology and computational power have
opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction
formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and
different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices.
While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions,
it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters
have the greatest impact on the performance on cost and efficiency.
The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via analytical and experimental methods.
Keywords
- Auctions
- Experimental
- Procurement
- Synergies
- Asymmetric Bidders
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