DagSemProc.07271.11.pdf
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On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2007-10-02
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Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, and Rakesh Vohra. On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11
Abstract
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.
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Keywords
- Mechanism Design
- Revenue Equivalence
- Graph Theory
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