DagSemProc.07271.12.pdf
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Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2007-10-02
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Kate Larson. Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12
Abstract
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for an item. In reality, bidders often have to go through a costly information-gathering process in order to learn their valuations. Recent attempts at modelling this phenomena has brought to light complex strategic behavior arising from information-gathering, and has shown that traditional approaches to auction and mechanism design are not able to overcome it.
Keywords
- Auctions
- Information Gathering
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