Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Zhang, Dongmo License
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12031

The Logic of Bargaining



This paper reexamines the game-theoretic bargaining theory from logic and Artificial Intelligence perspectives. We present an axiomatic characterization of the logical solutions to bargaining problems. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic with numerical representation of bargainers' preferences. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers' satisfaction. The solution is uniquely characterized by four axioms collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry and mutually comparable monotonicity in conjunction with three other fundamental assumptions individual rationality, consistency and comprehensiveness. The Pareto efficient solutions are characterized by the axioms scale invariance, Pareto optimality and restricted mutually comparable monotonicity along with the basic assumptions. The relationships of these axioms and assumptions and their links to belief revision postulates and game theory axioms are discussed. The framework would help us to identify the logical reasoning behind bargaining processes and would initiate a new methodology of bargaining analysis.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Dongmo Zhang},
  title =	{The Logic of Bargaining},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J{\'e}r{\^o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  number =	{07351},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bargaining theory, belief revision, game theory}

Keywords: Bargaining theory, belief revision, game theory
Seminar: 07351 - Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents
Related Scholarly Article:
Issue date: 2007
Date of publication: 2007

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