Voting in uncontrolled environments, such as the Internet comes with a price, the price of having to trust in uncontrolled machines the collection of voter's vote. An uncontrolled machine, e.g. the voter's PC, may be infected with a virus or other malicious program that may try to change the voter's vote without her knowledge. Here we present CodeVoting, a technique to create a secure communication channel to a smart card that prevents vote manipulation by the voter's PC, while at the same time allows the use of any cryptographic voting protocol to cast the vote.
@InProceedings{joaquim_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.6, author = {Joaquim, Rui and Ribeiro, Carlos}, title = {{CodeVoting: protecting against malicious vote manipulation at the voter's PC}}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Electronic Voting}, pages = {1--7}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2008}, volume = {7311}, editor = {David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.6}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12997}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.6}, annote = {Keywords: Internet voting, vote manipulation} }
Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing