How Discontinuous is Computing Nash Equilibria? (Extended Abstract)

Author Arno Pauly



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Arno Pauly

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Arno Pauly. How Discontinuous is Computing Nash Equilibria? (Extended Abstract). In 6th International Conference on Computability and Complexity in Analysis (CCA'09). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 11, pp. 197-208, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)
https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.CCA.2009.2271

Abstract

We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally, we restrict the treatment to two player games, but results and proofs extend to the $n$-player case. As a side result, the degree of discontinuity of solving systems of linear inequalities is settled.
Keywords
  • Game Theory
  • computable analysis
  • Nash equilibrium
  • discontinuity

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