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DART: A Real-Time Address-Randomization Defense with Predictable Timing (Artifact)

Authors Patrick Dobranowski , Owen Rice, Ryan Burrow , Nathan Burow , Bryan C. Ward

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Artifact Description

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DARTS.12.2.8.pdf
  • Filesize: 0.49 MB
  • 4 pages

Document Identifiers

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Security and privacy → Software security engineering
  • Computer systems organization → Real-time systems
  • Software and its engineering → Compilers
Keywords
  • real-time systems
  • code randomization
  • ASLR
  • WCET
  • cache analysis
  • software diversity

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Artifact

Abstract

This artifact accompanies the ECRTS 2026 paper on DART, a real-time address-randomization defense that randomizes the placement of basic blocks in the virtual address space at page-level granularity while preserving the cache-line behavior of the original binary, thereby keeping a binary’s instruction-cache timing analyzable across all valid randomizations. The artifact contains the full DART toolchain (a patched clang/LLVM 9 compiler, a modified gold linker, the prander randomizer, and a post-link ELF rewriter), distributed as a patch over the upstream Compiler-assisted Code Randomization (CCR) framework. It further contains a patched Linux 5.4.0 kernel whose loader honors DART’s color-aware program headers, the TACLeBench-derived benchmark sources used in the paper, and the experiment drivers and plotting scripts that produce the timing results reported in Section 5 of the companion paper. All components are publicly released so that the community can inspect, reuse, and extend the implementation underlying the paper’s claims.

Cite As Get BibTex

Patrick Dobranowski, Owen Rice, Ryan Burrow, Nathan Burow, and Bryan C. Ward. DART: A Real-Time Address-Randomization Defense with Predictable Timing (Artifact). In Special Issue of the 38th European Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2026). Dagstuhl Artifacts Series (DARTS), Volume 12, Issue 2, pp. 8:1-8:4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026) https://doi.org/10.4230/DARTS.12.2.8

Author Details

Patrick Dobranowski
  • Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA
Owen Rice
  • Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA
Ryan Burrow
  • MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, USA
Nathan Burow
  • MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, USA
Bryan C. Ward
  • Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

Related Article

  • Patrick Dobranowski, Owen Rice, Ryan Burrow, Nathan Burow, and Bryan C. Ward, "DART: A Real-Time Address-Randomization Defense with Predictable Timing", in 38th European Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2026), LIPIcs, Vol. 375, pp. 10:1-10:26, 2026. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2026.10

References

  1. Hyungjoon Koo, Yaohui Chen, Long Lu, Vasileios P. Kemerlis, and Michalis Polychronakis. Compiler-assisted code randomization. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 461-477. IEEE, 2018. URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2018.00029.
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