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Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions

Author Kate Larson



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DagSemProc.07271.12.pdf
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Kate Larson

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Kate Larson. Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12

Abstract

Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for an item. In reality, bidders often have to go through a costly information-gathering process in order to learn their valuations. Recent attempts at modelling this phenomena has brought to light complex strategic behavior arising from information-gathering, and has shown that traditional approaches to auction and mechanism design are not able to overcome it.
Keywords
  • Auctions
  • Information Gathering

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