We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
@InProceedings{grigorieva_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.7, author = {Grigorieva, Elena and Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Vermeulen, Dries}, title = {{Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations}}, booktitle = {Computational Social Systems and the Internet}, pages = {1--9}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2007}, volume = {7271}, editor = {Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11616}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7}, annote = {Keywords: Query auctions, ex post equilibrium, efficiency} }
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