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CrudiTEE: A Stick-And-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency Wallets with TEEs

Authors Lulu Zhou , Zeyu Liu , Fan Zhang , Michael K. Reiter

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Author Details

Lulu Zhou
  • Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Zeyu Liu
  • Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Fan Zhang
  • Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Michael K. Reiter
  • Duke University, New Haven, CT, USA

Funding

This work was funded in part by NSF grant 2207214 and an Ethereum Academic Grant.

Cite AsGet BibTex

Lulu Zhou, Zeyu Liu, Fan Zhang, and Michael K. Reiter. CrudiTEE: A Stick-And-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency Wallets with TEEs. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 16:1-16:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.16

Abstract

Cryptocurrency introduces usability challenges by requiring users to manage signing keys. Popular signing key management services (e.g., custodial wallets), however, either introduce a trusted party or burden users with managing signing key shares, posing the same usability challenges. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) is a promising technology to avoid both, but practical implementations of TEEs suffer from various side-channel attacks that have proven hard to eliminate. This paper explores a new approach to side-channel mitigation through economic incentives for TEE-based cryptocurrency wallet solutions. By taking the cost and profit of side-channel attacks into consideration, we designed a Stick-and-Carrot-based cryptocurrency wallet, CrudiTEE, that leverages penalties (the stick) and rewards (the carrot) to disincentivize attackers from exfiltrating signing keys in the first place. We model the attacker’s behavior using a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to evaluate the effectiveness of the bounty and enable the service provider to adjust the parameters of the bounty’s reward function accordingly.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Security and privacy → Authorization
  • Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures
Keywords
  • Cryptocurrency wallet
  • blockchain

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