Transaction details and participant identities on the blockchain are often publicly exposed. In this work, we posit that blockchain’s transparency should not come at the cost of privacy. To that end, we introduce zero-knowledge authenticators (zkAt), a new cryptographic primitive for privacy-preserving authentication on public blockchains. zkAt utilizes zero-knowledge proofs to enable users to authenticate transactions, while keeping the underlying authentication policies private. Prior solutions for such policy-private authentication required the use of threshold signatures, which can only hide the threshold access structure itself. In comparison, zkAt provides privacy for arbitrarily complex authentication policies, and offers a richer interface even within the threshold access structure by, for instance, allowing for the combination of signatures under distinct signature schemes. In order to construct zkAt, we design a compiler that transforms the popular Groth16 non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof system into a NIZK with equivocable verification keys, a property that we define in this work. Then, for any zkAt constructed using proof systems with this new property, we show that all public information must be independent of the policy, thereby achieving policy-privacy. Next, we give an extension of zkAt, called zkAt^+ wherein, assuming a trusted authority, policies can be updated obliviously in the sense that a third-party learns no new information when a policy is updated by the policy issuer. We also give a theoretical construction for zkAt^+ using recursive NIZKs, and explore the integration of zkAt into modern blockchains. Finally, to evaluate their feasibility, we implement both our schemes for a specific threshold access structure. Our findings show that zkAt achieves comparable performance to traditional threshold signatures, while also attaining privacy for significantly more complex policies with very little overhead.
@InProceedings{kryptoschalkias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2, author = {Kryptos Chalkias, Kostas and Maram, Deepak and Roy, Arnab and Wang, Joy and Yadav, Aayush}, title = {{Zero-Knowledge Authenticator for Blockchain: Policy-Private and Obliviously Updateable}}, booktitle = {7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)}, pages = {2:1--2:23}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-400-0}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2025}, volume = {354}, editor = {Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247218}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2}, annote = {Keywords: Blockchain privacy, authentication schemes, threshold wallets, zero knowledge proofs} }