This paper studies the rational synthesis problem for multi-player games played on graphs when rational players are following subgame perfect equilibria. In these games, one player, the system, declares his strategy upfront, and the other players, composing the environment, then rationally respond by playing strategies forming a subgame perfect equilibrium. We study the complexity of the rational synthesis problem when the players have ω-regular objectives encoded as parity objectives. Our algorithm is based on an encoding into a three-player game with imperfect information, showing that the problem is in 2ExpTime. When the number of environment players is fixed, the problem is in ExpTime and is NP- and coNP-hard. Moreover, for a fixed number of players and reachability objectives, we get a polynomial algorithm.
@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12, author = {Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and Reynouard, Alexis and Van Den Bogaard, Marie}, title = {{The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and \omega-Regular Objectives}}, booktitle = {36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)}, pages = {12:1--12:23}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-389-8}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2025}, volume = {348}, editor = {Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239622}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12}, annote = {Keywords: non-zero-sum games, subgame perfect equilibria, rational synthesis} }
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